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Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Discovery: A Treaty-
Based Reappraisal
David Wilkins*
The discovery doctrine is one of the baseline legal concepts
that has worked to seriously disadvantage the land rights of in-
digenous nations in the United States because it asserts, as one
of its definitions, that the "discovering" European nations and
their successor states, gained legal title to Indian lands in North
America. The author argues, using comparative colonial and
early American treaty, legislative, and other historical data, that
this definition is a legal fiction. In historical reality, discovery
was merely an exclusive and preemptive right that vested in the
discovering state the right offirst purchase.
"Again, were we to inquire by what law or authority you set up a claim
[to our land], I answer, none! Your laws extend not into our country, nor
ever did. You talk of the law of nature and the law of nations, and they
are both against you."1
Ownership of land was, of course, the basic question at issue
between Indians and Europeans in North America, as it was be-
tween the Europeans who contended with each other for posses-
sion. There was a fundamental difference in these two contests,
however. The Europeans agreed on the conditions and preroga-
tives of ownership, and fought over the right to exercise them.
Associate Professor of Political Science and American Indian Studies at the University
of Arizona, Tucson; Ph.D., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Dr. Wilkins is a
Lumbee Indian. The author would like to thank Vine Deloria, Jr., for his insight and
outstanding critique of the Article.
1. Excerpted from a speech by Corn Tassel, an elder Cherokee leader, delivered to the
United States commissioners who sought a peace treaty with the Cherokee in 1785, in
NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM
PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-1992, at 122-23 (Peter Nabokov ed., 1991).
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The Indians not only opposed the Europeans' efforts, they denied
utterly the validity of the underlying concepts?
INTRODUCTION
The European doctrine of discovery principle, recognized as
recently as 1986 by a federal district court as "a legal fiction,"
3
nevertheless remains one of the most entrenched and baffling legal
doctrines undergirding federal Indian policy and law. Its continuing legal
and perceptual force perpetuates a second class national status for tribal
nations and relegates individual Indians to a second class citizenship
status with regards to their incomplete property rights. This doctrine
holds, under its most widely understood and debilitating definition, that
European explorers' "discovery" of land in the Americas gave the
discovering European nation-and the United States as successor-
absolute legal title and ownership of American soil, reducing Indian
tribes to being mere tenants with a lesser beneficial interest in their
aboriginal homelands.
Although this bizarre doctrine has come under increasing and well-
deserved scrutiny by indigenous4 and non-indigenous5 scholars and
commentators, the discovery principle, along with the doctrine of plenary
power6 and the trust principle, represents one of the essential
2. DOROTHY V. JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE: COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN EARLY
AMERICA 18 (1982).
3. See Oneida Indian Nation v. State, 649 F. Supp. 420, 424 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
4. See Vine Deloria's co-authored study, American Indians, American Justice 2-6
(1983); FRANKE WIMER, THE INDIGENOUS VOICE IN WORLD POLITICS I (Francis A. Beer
& Ted Robert Gurr eds., 1993) (quoting Robert T. Coulter, Indian Law Resource Center
Director); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 99, 201 (1990); David E. Wilkins, Johnson v.
M'Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. United States, 19 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 159, 159-81 (1994).
5. See Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Revisited, 31
HASTINGS L. J. 122 (1980); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1, 24-26 (1987).
6. Complete in all aspects or essentials. However, in federal Indian policy and law the
term plenary has three distinct meanings: 1) exclusive-Congress, under the Commerce
Clause, is vested with sole authority to regulate the federal government's affairs with
tribes; b) preemptive-Congress may enact legislation which effectively precludes state
government's acting in Indian related matters; c) unlimited or absolute-Congress is held
to have virtually boundless authority and jurisdiction over Indian tribes, their lands, and
their resources.
7. The trust doctrine, also known as the trust relationship, has historical roots in several
sources: in treaties and agreements with tribes; in the international law doctrine of trus-
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paradigmatic legs on which is constructed the federal government's
allegedl Z superior political and territorial standing vis-A-vis indigenous
nations. Like these other important contemporary and equally
problematic9 legal rules, discovery has more than one definition. When it
is defined as conquest or as benevolent paternalism, it belittles the
autonomy of tribes and leaves them in a relatively powerless political
and economic position vis-a-vis the federal government. It deprives tribal
nations, even as they approach the twenty-first century, of full legal
ownership of lands they have inhabited since time immemorial.
However, and to use Chief Justice John Marshall's phrase, when we
view the "actual state of things'"1 that developed during the colonial and
early American period, discovery is understood as doing nothing more
than granting an exclusive and preemptive right to the discovering
nation. The exclusive right they gained was simply to be the first
purchaser of Indian land should the tribe agree to sell any of its territory.
It is this "actual state of affairs" this Article attempts to recall.
DISCOVERY AS CONQUEST
In its most brazen and negative sense-discovery as a legal weapon
for a colonial juggernaut-as shown in Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States,"
the discovery principle is used to deny utterly that the aboriginal title of
indigenous nations is a legal title that is compensable under the
Constitution's Fifth Amendment if that title is taken by the United States.
In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Supreme Court ruled that "Indian occupation of land
teeship; and in constitutional clauses, executive orders, and statutory case law. Broadly,
this doctrine entails the unique legal and moral duty of the federal government to assist
Indian tribes in the protection of their lands, resources, and cultural heritage. The federal
government, many courts have maintained, is to be held to the highest standards of good
faith and honesty in its dealings with Indian peoples.
8. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,.470 U.S. 226 (1985); New
Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. AaModt, 618 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.M. 1985); Bear v. United
States, 611 F. Supp. 589 (D. Neb. 1985); Oneida Indian Nation v. State, 649 F. Supp. 420
(N.D.N.Y. 1986); Oneida Indian Nation v. New'York, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988);
Alabama-Coushatta Tribe v. United States, 1996 U.S. Claims LEXIS 128 (Fed. Cl. July
22, 1996). State courts have also grappled with the doctrine: see, In re Wilson, 634 P.2d
363 (Cal. 1981); In re Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76
(1988); State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992).
9. See David Wilkins, The U.S. Supreme Court's Explication of "Federal Plenary
Power:" An Analysis of Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty, 1886-1914, 18 AM.
INDIAN Q. 349, 349-68 (1994); David Wilkins, Convoluted Essence: Indian Rights and
the Federal Trust Doctrine, 14 NATIvE AM. 24, 24-31 (1997).
10. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832).
11. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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without government recognition of ownership creates no rights against
taking or extinction by the United States protected by the Fifth
Amendment or any other principle of law."' 2 This conclusion is wholly
without merit and represents the extreme application of the political
interpretation of the discovery doctrine four hundred and fifty years after
the fact.
The discovery principle, in this instance, is symbiotically linked
with the equally problematic doctrine of conquest, another European-
derived legal principle, which theoretically entails the acquisition of
territory by a victorious state from a defeated state in warfare. The
conquest doctrine has been utilized by European colonial powers to
justify their territorial acquisition to much of Africa, parts of Asia, and
portions of the Western hemisphere throughout the last half-millennium.
However, as Milner Ball showed in his analysis of Johnson v.
M'Intosh,13 "in the case of the Europeans and Indians, however,
incorporation-the humanitarian rule after conquest-was impossible.
The Indians had not been conquered, and they would not mingle."' 4
While acknowledging that Marshall used some language in the M'ntosh
opinion which can be construed to mean that the idea of conquest was
applied to indigenous-European/American relations, Ball points to other
more persuasive language employed by Marshall both in M'Intosh and in
Worcester v. Georgia,5 which showed that the conquest doctrine had to
do with the way Europeans dealt with one another "as they attempted to
assert and defend territorial claims."' 6 Notwithstanding this, and the fact
that the federal government disavowed use of the conquest doctrine when
it chose to pursue a policy of purchasing Indian lands via treaties and
agreements, some Justices have disputably drawn upon conquest as a
basis upon which the federal government derives its title to Indian
Country.
For example, Justice Reed described the American's alleged
conquest of Indians in Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and
that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in
12. Id. at 285.
13.21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
14. Ball, supra note 5, at 27.
15.31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
16. Ball, supra note 5, at 28 n.132.
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return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the
conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.
17
This statement is one of the most glaring misrepresentations of fact
ever uttered by a Supreme Court Justice. There is little in the historical
record to corroborate Justice Reed's contention. Federal Indian policy
and the history of treaty-making give ample evidence to the contrary.
Article three of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance 8 was one of the first
major congressional policy pronouncements which stated that good faith,
justice, and humanity, not military conquest, were to be the underpinning
political and moral principles guiding the federal government's dealing
with tribal nations.
The Supreme Court also, early in the nation's history, disavowed
the conquest doctrine as a method by which the federal government
gained any territorial rights to land. As John Marshall stated in Worcester
v. Georgia: 19
In this view perhaps our ancestors, when they first migrated to
this country, might have taken possession of a limited extent of
the domain, had they been sufficiently powerful, without nego-
tiation or purchase from the native Indians. But this course is be-
lieved to have been nowhere taken. A more conciliatory mode
was preferred, and one which was better calculated to impress
the Indians, who were then powerful, with a sense of the justice
of their white neighbours.
20
In other words, treaty negotiation, not military coercion, was the
primary basis on which United States Indian policy operated. This non-
conquest view was upheld by the Supreme Court in Mitchel v. United
States,21 where Justice Baldwin declared that "[b]y thus holding treaties
with these Indians, accepting of cessions from them with reservations,
and establishing boundaries with them, the king [of England] waived all
rights accruing by conquest or cession, and thus most solemnly
acknowledged that the Indians had rights of property which they could
cede or reserve ....
17. Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955).
18. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
19. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
20. Id. at 579-80.
21.34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
22. Id. at 749.
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The United States, said Baldwin, could not assume the right of
conquest because it had renounced such a policy when it chose to
continue the treaty relationship with tribes that Great Britain, Spain, and
France had followed.23
DISCOVERY AS BENEVOLENT PATERNALISM
Conversely, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia4 crafted a definition of
discovery as benevolent paternalism. In this application, which some
have likened to the federal trust doctrine, it is posited that indigenous
nations are ward-like entities incompetent to fully manage their own
territorial affairs. Such tasks of land management, consolidation, and
even sales, are to be left to the federal "guardian," which is empowered
to act on behalf of the tribal wards because of their alleged technical and
cultural incapacities.
Although it can be forcefully argued that the so-called guardian-
ward relationship is not synonymous with the more commonly asserted
trustee-beneficiary relationship, there is one crucial element both
descriptions share; according to much contemporary federal court
precedent, tribal nations do not possess full legal title 5 to their territory
but have merely a possessory or occupancy interest. Generally, the
Indian occupancy or possessory right, whether recognized or established
by aboriginal possession, treaty, congressional act, executive order,
purchase, or by action of some other sovereign, is held to involve an
exclusive right of occupancy but only rarely involves the ultimate fee to
the land.26
The federal government is presumed, under contemporary judicial
interpretation, because of the discovery principle, to hold the ultimate fee
subject to the Indian right of occupancy. Although federal case law
vacillates on the precise content of the Indian possessory title, with some
opinions holding that it is a "mere" right of occupancy, while others refer
to it as a "sacred" right of occupancy, there is a general consensus that
23. See id. at 754.
24. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
25. Also known as fee-simple ownership, which is an estate in land of which the in-
heritor has unqualified ownership and sole power of disposition of a parcel of land.
26. Two exceptions here would be the various Pueblo peoples who hold fee simple title
to their lands under grants from the Spanish and Mexican governments (it was later
placed under trust by the federal government); and the Eastern Band of Cherokee of
North Carolina who purchased land with individual funds that were at first held under
single title, next by a private trustee, then by the Band itself when it incorporated, and
finally by the federal government when it was asked by the Cherokee to place the land
under federal trust status.
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while Indian title is an exclusive right, it does not involve an ultimate fee
to the land.2 Until such time as the federal government grants the actual
fee-title to a tribe or individual Indian, the Indian's title, it is said by
those who support this perspective, cannot be sold without explicit
authorization by the federal government.
DISCOVERY AS AN EXCLUSIVE & PREEMPTIVE RIGHT OF FIRST
PURCHASE
Notwithstanding these previous definitions which have come to
form the dominant paradigm on Indian title vis-i-vis federal title that has
arisen over the last one hundred years, a critical reading of European and
early American land policies, the literal language of European and early
American treaties, United States congressional directives, and specific
comments from American officials vividly shows that the doctrine of
discovery was merely an exclusive preemptive rule that limited the rights
of the discoverers or their successors and entailed no limitation on the
preexisting land title of tribes.
Ownership of the North American continent rested, quite evidently,
in the hands of the indigenous peoples as it always had. And contrary to
the later and now prevailing assumptions about the "ultimate fee" being
placed in the hands of the discovering European nation-state or the
United States as successor, the historical record shows that legal
ownership of what became known as the United States resided fully in
the hands of tribal nations, and not in the United States, which eventually
succeeded each of the other European sovereigns who had been
jockeying for control of North America. Indian tribes retained complete
ownership of their respective territories until such time as they formally
ceded their claims to land in a consensual treaty arrangement with one of
the competing European nations or, later, with the Americans.
Although the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. M'Intosh
in 1823, would articulate a definition of discovery which allegedly
vested a superior legal title in the United States, this Article argues that
such a characterization directly clashes with the tribal understanding of
their rights to land. Moreover, it runs contrary to the practice and
perspectives of the previous European sovereigns and later of the views
of the political and judicial branches of the federal government. Before
and after M'Intosh, the premise was that Indian Country was just that,
Indian Country, with title resting in the particular tribes inhabiting a
given territory.
27. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 293 (1972).
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Finally, this Article argues that because the political branches are
constitutionally charged with establishing and maintaining the treaty
relationship and overseeing federal Indian policy, it is time for an
important and long overdue correction to be issued. It is time for the
discovery principle, when defined as conquest, and benevolent
paternalism to be explicitly disavowed by the federal government.
INDIGENOUS LAND TITLE: As RECOGNIZED BY EUROPEAN POWERS
Of the various European nation-states which colonized North
America, the three with the most lasting influence upon tribes and federal
Indian policy were Spain, France, and Great Britain. Without elaborating
in great detail about the respective Indian policies of each of these
imperial powers, since these have been chronicled sufficiently
elsewhere, suffice it to say that each of these European powers crafted
its Indian policy based on its own unique mix of religious, cultural,
economic, and political factors. It is equally accurate, and just as
compelling, to note that "Indian cooperation was the prime requisite for
European penetration and colonization of the North American
continent. ' 2
This is not to say that the competing European powers always
sought out the cooperation of indigenous peoples, or that the level of
violence was not high. It certainly was. It is really an acknowledgement
28. For Spanish policy see generally JACK D. FORBES, APACHE, NAVAJO, AND SPANIARD
(1960); LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF
AMERICA (1949); EDWARD H. SPICER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST: THE IMPACT OF SPAIN,
MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE INDIANS OF THE SOUTHWEST, 1533-1960
(1962); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990). For French policy see JOHN H. KENNEDY, JESUIT
AND SAVAGE IN NEW FRANCE (1950); DENYS DELAGE, BrrrER FEAST: AMERINDIANS AND
EUROPEANS IN NORTHEASTERN NORTH AMERICA, 1600-64 (Jane Brierley trans., 1993);
Mason Wade, French Indian Policies, in 4 HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS 20-28
(Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1988). For Great Britain's Indian policy see WILBUR R.
JACOBS, DISPOSSESSING THE AMERICAN INDIAN: INDIANS AND WHITES ON THE COLONIAL
FRONTIER (1972); FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS,
COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST (1975); see also EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 20 vol's projected (Alden T. Vaughan ed.,
1979 forward) which is an excellent compilation not only of British and early American
treaties, but which also contain a number of Dutch treaties with northeastern tribes.
29. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY
VISIONS OF LAW & PEACE, 1600-1800, at 20 (1997) (quoting FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE
AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE: THE COVENANT CHAIN CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN TRIBES
wrm ENGLISH COLONIES FROM ITS BEGINNING TO THE LANCASTER TREATY OF 1744
(1984)).
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that had tribes been unwilling and unable to negotiate a plethora of
diplomatic arrangements with the various intruding competitors, the
amount of violence would have been much worse, and the important and
extant treaty legacy of each of these states with tribal nations would not
have evolved to the degree it did.
As Williams shows in his recent study,
[i]n the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Encounter era,
European colonists often found themselves outnumbered and
outflanked with a bare foothold on the North American conti-
nent. During much of this period, whites in their small colonial
settlements were not the dominant power on the continent. They
soon learned that their survival, flourishing, and expansion could
be better secured through cooperative relationships with sur-
rounding Indian tribes rather than through wars and conflict.
30
SPANISH RECOGNITION OF INDIAN TITLE
Francisco de Vitoria, a prominent Spanish theologian, was asked in
the 1530s by his Catholic monarch, the King of Spain, to address what
the rights of the Spanish were in the New World and, by extension, what
rights, if any, the indigenous peoples retained in the face of Spanish
colonialism. Spanish administrators had already introduced and were
reaping the political and economic benefits of destructive policies like
the requerimiento (a formal document of conquest), the encomienda
system (a policy of enslavement of indigenous people--encomienda-
assigned to the enslaver-the encomendero), and the related
repartimiento (a system of wage assessments the Spanish Crown levied
on Indian communities).'
When Vitoria delivered his lecture in 1532 entitled On the Indians
Lately Discovered, this confirmed not only that the indigenous peoples
possessed natural rights, but also that as free people they were the "true
owners" of the land they inhabited. The doctrine of discovery, in other
words, which had been used by Spanish explorers as justification-with
the Pope's blessing-for denying the Indians' aboriginal claims to their
30. WILLIAMs, supra note 29, at 20-21. See also Dorothy Jones, British Colonial Indian
Treaties, in 4 HISTORY OF INDtAN-WHIrE RELATIONS 185-94 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed.,
1988).
31. See Charles Gibson, Spanish Indian Policies, in 4 HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE
RELATIONS 96-102 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1988).
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lands, was jettisoned as a basis on which the Spanish thereafter could
claim legal title to inhabited Indian land.
Victoria's lectures were not entirely a pro-Indian manifesto,
however. He also asserted that Indians also had duties under the Law of
Nations, including allowing the Spanish the right to travel through their
lands and to trade with them.32 But for purposes of this Article, it was
Victoria's comments on the discovery doctrine which merit attention.
Since Indians owned the land, the Spanish Crown could not claim title
through discovery because title by discovery was valid only where
property was without ownership. In the absence of a just war, only the
voluntary consent of the Indians could justify the confiscation of Indian
land.33
The most practical manner, at least in North America, by which the
Spanish and other European nations proceeded to secure the goodwill
and consent of tribes for the establishment of peace and friendship, trade,
military alliance, the delineation of territorial boundaries, land cessions,
and to secure their foothold on the frontier against other European
competitors, was through the negotiation of treaties. And as Jones and
Williams show in their works, the majority of these treaty
arrangements-regardless of the European nation doing the
negotiating-were steeped in indigenous understandings of diplomacy:
The protocols and ceremonies of this indigenous North Ameri-
can language of diplomacy were rarely European, because it was
a language grounded in indigenous North American visions of
law and peace between different peoples. The hierarchical, feu-
dal symbols of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century European di-
plomacy simply did not translate well on the North American
colonial frontier.
34
Spain, for example, negotiated a multitude of treaties with
southeastern (Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole) and southwestern (Navajo
and Apache) tribal nations from the early 1700s through the first part of
the nineteenth century. The Navajo signed four treaties with the Spanish,
from 1706 to 1819, and six with the Mexican government, from 1822 to
1844. The primary purpose of these diplomatic arrangements were peace
and friendship, trade, military alliance, exchange of prisoners, and
32. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 101-02.
33. See VINE DELORIA, JR., & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE 2-3 (1983); WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 96-108.
34. WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 31.
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recognizing the territorial boundaries of the indigenous nations.3 There
was, in fact, in these negotiations no recognition of Spanish
proprietorship (land ownership) over Indian lands, though the Crown did
claim sovereignty or dominion (jurisdiction or control) vis-i-vis other
European nations and sometimes over indigenous peoples as well. A
claim of sovereignty, however, does not equate with a claim of
ownership.
A treaty negotiated on May 31 and June 1, 1784, between Spain and
the Talapuchy (Seminole), Natchez, and Chickasaws verifies this. The
preamble stated that the parties desired
unanimously to obliterate the remembrance of the evils caused
by the last war, and to make all the subjects of his Catholic Maj-
esty enjoy the fruits of peace, to conclude and cement, on the
most solid foundations, the friendship and good union which the
Spanish nations proffers to the Talapuchy tribes... 36
Contained within the first few articles were the major points of the
treaty: 1) maintain an "inviolable peace and fidelity," 2) encourage
"commerce permanent and unalterable," and 3) establish a firm military
alliance, with the Talapuchy agreeing to arrest any person who entered
their country "with the insidious idea of inducing us [the Talapuchy] to
take up arms" against the King of Spain. The concluding provision,
article thirteen, dealt specifically with Indian title, and the Spanish
negotiators unequivocally acknowledged the Indians territorial rights:
As the generous mind of his Catholic Majesty does not exact
from the nations of Indians any lands to form establishments, to
the prejudice of the right of those who enjoy them, in conse-
quence, and with a knowledge of his paternal love towards his
beloved nations, we promise, in his royal name, the security and
guarantee of those which they actually hold, according to the
right of property with which they possess them, on condition that
they are comprehended within the lines and limits of his Catholic
Majesty, our sovereign.37
35. See DAVID E. WILKINS, DINd BIBEEHAZ'AANii: A HANDBOOK OF NAVAJO
GOVERNMENT I1 (1987).
36. 1 DOCUMENTs, LEGISLATIVE AND ExEcuTivE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 13TH CONGRESS, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 278 (Washington, Gales & Seaton
1832) [hereinafter AMEitCAN STATE PAPERS].
37. Id. at 279.
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With the exception of the ubiquitous paternalistic language where the
Indians were asked to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Spanish King,
this article evidences the Spanish recognition of full indigenous
ownership of their lands.
The Spanish Crown in 1790 negotiated a treaty of friendship with
the Chickasaw and Choctaw in which the three nations mutually
promised to "love one another reciprocally" and to act as staunch allies
should any other party attempt to interfere in their relationship. This
treaty also contained provisions demarcating the boundaries of the
Spanish Crown in the Floridas and Louisiana and the two tribes'
territory. Article four stated that "the Spanish nation declares and
acknowledges that all the lands to the east of the said dividing line of the
2d article belong lawfully and indisputably to the Chickasaw and
Choctaw nations, promising to support them therein with all their
power.
' 38
FRENCH RECOGNITION OF INDIAN TITLE
France's policy towards tribal nations and their lands differed
substantively from those of both Spain and Great Britain. In 1897
Frances Parkman gave a pithy, if generalized, summation of the three
competitors' views toward Indian tribes: "Spanish civilization crushed
the Indian; English civilization scorned and neglected him; French
civilization embraced and cherished him.' z9 On the whole, this
assessment is largely accurate according to most commentators,
particularly as it relates to the French willingness to closely interact with
Indian peoples. As Wade described it: "The French, with their lack of
racial prejudice, were able to achieve a much closer relationship with the
Indians than any other European colonists in North America.
'5°
The French were active in North America from the time of Jacques
Cartier's travels in the Northeast in 1534 to their defeat at the hands of
the English in the French and Indian War that ended in 1763. In the
Treaty of Paris, which contained the terms of the war's cessation, French
Canada and lands east of the Mississippi were ceded to Great Britain.4'
French fur traders, Jesuit missionaries, and soldiers, who probably
never totaled more than 70,000 as late as 1759, inhabited the vast area
38. Id. at 280.
39. Wade, supra note 28, at 20.
40. Id.
41. See Walter Nugent, Comparing Wests and Frontiers, in THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN WEST 817 (Clyde A. Milner, II, et al. eds., 1994).
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from Quebec to the Great Lakes and south to New Orleans, Louisiana. In
part because of their small numbers, but more by concerted
governmental policy and their emphasis on trade rather than permanent
settlement, the French tended to get along well with most tribes. A major
payoff of this generally peaceful coexistence was that there were few
contentious encounters over land. As Cyrus Thomas noted in his analysis
of French policy towards Indian lands: "A somewhat thorough
examination of the documents and histories relating to French dominion
in Canada and Louisiana fails to reveal any settled or regularly defined
policy in regard to the extinguishment of the Indian title to land.""2
This is evident, on a local level, in one land transaction that took
place between a Frenchman and a married French couple. The purchaser
of the French couple's deeded property was advised that the deed was
valid unless the Indians-the original owners--decided to retake the
property. A caveat such as this would most likely not have been found in
land exchanges among the English.43
The French, throughout the territory they explored, trapped, and
sparsely settled, apparently made no recorded efforts to claim Indian land
based on the doctrine of discovery. In their treaty negotiations, they, like
the Spanish, usually encouraged the signatory tribes to refer to them as
their "sovereign," and tried, unsuccessfully, to place the tribes in a
subject status. They were desperately in need of the tribe's aid as trade,
political, and military allies in their economic wars-most notably the
fur trade-against their primary European competitors, the British, and
usually did not insist on maintaining the false belief that tribes were their
subjects. These circumstances, in fact, compelled the French in the late
1500s and early 1600s into a number of unrecorded trade and military
pacts with the tribes of Northeastern North America (the Abenaki,
Micmac, Nipissing, Huron, Montagnais, Maliseet, Passamaquoddy, and
Algonquian) against the powerful Iroquois Confederacy whose tribes
traded first with the Dutch and later with the English from their territory
in Northern New York.44
By the 1660s, the Iroquois, although weakened by diseases, had
become the dominant indigenous peoples in the Northeast and had
42. Cyrus Thomas, Introduction, in Indian Land Cessions in the United States,
EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERWCAN ETHNOLOGY TO THE
SEcRErARY OF THE SMrrHSONIAN INSTITUTION, 1896-97, pt. 2, 545 (Charles C. Royce
comp., 1899).
43. See Jay Gitlin, Empires of Trade, Hinterlands of Settlement, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE AMEmCAN WEST 108 (Clyde Milner, II, et al. eds., 1994).
44. See DELAGE, supra note 28, at 95.
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vanquished the Huron, Petun, Neutral, and Erie Nations. They had also
driven the Algonquian-speaking nations out of the eastern Great Lakes,
the Michigan Peninsula, and the Ohio Valley.45 The extant treaty record
between the French and indigenous nations is, unfortunately, quite
slight.4 A majority of the early French and indigenous alliances were
conducted in the traditional manner. That is to say, these delicate
multicultural negotiations were usually prolonged conferences where the
leaders of both parties discussed, in great detail and at great length, the
key points, exchanged presents and other items, and participated in
tribally-appropriate cultural ceremonies to informally and yet profoundly
seal the arrangement.
Fortunately, however, a few treaties were formally recorded in
French and later translated into English. On December 13, 1665,
Governor Chevalier Seigneur de Tracy and others, representing France,
signed a treaty of peace with leaders of several member nations of the
Iroquois Confederacy (Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Oneida). The
treaty was negotiated at Quebec. None of the treaty's provisions involved
any French claims to Indian lands. Its primary purpose was the renewing
of the friendship between the Iroquois and the French in the wake of a
battle in which the Iroquois had killed a number of French citizens. It
also contained a provision where the Iroquois promised not to harass or
make war on France's allies-the Hurons and Algonquians. Other
provisions focused on an exchange of prisoners (article 3), the Iroquois
requesting two Jesuit missionaries to live among them (article 4), the
French securing the right to hunt and fish in Indian country (article 5),
and the Iroquois agreeing to send two of their prominent families to live
among the French "in order to render the desired union of the Iroquois
and French Nations the stronger and more stable... ." (article 6)47
In an attached note entitled Ratification by the Senecas of the
preceding treaty,48 it was stated that the French had "discovered their
45. See Neal Salisbury, Indian-White Relations in North America Before 1776, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 286 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1996).
46. There is evidence that the French negotiated written treaties with tribes in 1622,
1653, 1665, and 1701. For reference to several of these, see the index of THE JESUIT
RELATIONS AND ALLIED DOCUMENTS: TRAVELs AND EXPLORATIONS OF THE JESUIT
MISSIONARIES IN NEW FRANCE, 1610-1791, 73 vols. (Reuben Gold Thwaites ed. & trans.,
1896-1901). For a verbatim transcript of a treaty between the French and the Iroquois, see
3 DOCUMENTS RELATrvE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 121-25
(E.B. O'Callaghan ed., 1853) [hereinafter DOCUMENrs]. See also 9 DOCUMENTS at 44-47
(providing for the records of several other treaties with the Iroquois (1853-1855)).
47. 3 DOCUMENTS, supra note 46, at 121-25.
48. See id. at 125.
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Country" and that the Senecas were to be considered "faithful
subjects."49 But this was immediately counterbalanced by the statement
that "it might please his Majesty to continue it [their lands] to them.'4 0 In
other words, the French wanted the Indians to consider themselves
French subjects for alliance purposes, but knew that any attempt to claim
title to Indian lands would have been met with disbelieving tribal ears
and fierce resistance.51
Some years later in 1688, the Onondaga, Cayuga, and Oneida
consented to declare their neutrality in the latest war that had erupted
between the French and the English. This "declaration of neutrality"
contains impressive language describing these tribal nations' title to their
lands. To show their willingness to maintain the peace, these nations
stressed that "they held their country directly of God, and had never been
conquered in war, neither by the French nor the English, and that their
intention was only to observe a perfect neutrality .... , 52
BRITISH RECOGNITION OF INDIAN TITLE
We close our discussion of the colonial era, appropriately, with a
brief analysis of the Indian policies of Great Britain, the Mother Country
from which the American colonies grew and would later revolt against,
and in whose legal, political, and cultural traditions the Americans
largely followed. Unlike the French, the British and her American
colonies were more intent on permanent settlement in North America
than in simple trade and political alliances with the tribes. Commerce, of
course, played a crucial role in tribal/British affairs, but it was intimately
connected to the colonization goals of the English.
While there was a measure of intermixture between tribes and the
British, particularly insofar as their diplomatic affairs evolved, the broad
goal of the British was the replacement of the tribes on their land by
Whites who always seemed to be clamoring for more territory to meet
the voracious land appetite of their ever increasing human population.53
Such a goal, however, was not easily realized, and British policy towards




51. See id. at 125.
52. Id.; see also 9 DOCUMENTs, supra note 46, at 384-85 (1855).
53. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERIcAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS:
THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834, at 6 (1962).
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The one aspect of British Indian policy that was somewhat
predictable was that it "allowed no special place for the American Indian,
who was regarded as a kind of nonperson. 54 Notwithstanding this
ethnocentric perspective, as Dorothy Jones points out in her article,
British Colonial Indian Treaties,55 of the 175 treaties negotiated between
Britain and the British colonies with Indian tribes from 1607 (with the
Powhatan Confederacy of Virginia) to a treaty in 1775 (between the
Iroquois of Ohio, the Shawnee, and the Delaware and the Virginia
colony), when the British and the tribes met on the frontier in treaty
negotiations, a "new kind of diplomacy took shape." This was a
diplomacy "that developed its own protocols and ceremonies, and these
were rarely European. ' 56
These treaties generally centered on the establishment of peace and
friendship, alliance, trade, return of captives or exchange of hostages,
boundary establishment or revision, or land cessions. The establishment
of peace and alliance or the negotiation of military or trade alliances,
however, were by far the most common reasons the British had for
negotiating treaties with tribes. This was especially the case from 1700 to
1763 when the French and Spanish still had designs on North America.
Those treaties devoted to Indian land cessions confirmed the reality that
the negotiating tribes were the true owners of the soil. The British and
the colonists' "purchase" of Indian territory via treaties or deeds was a
clear acknowledgement that the doctrine of discovery was not a
limitation of Indian land rights but was simply a constraining device
governing inter-European claims in North America.
For example, in a peace treaty between Governor Richard Nicolls of
New York and the Esopus Indians, dated October 3, 1665, there is a
provision in which the tribe ceded a tract of land to the Governor in
exchange for blankets, powder, and other implements. Article five stated
that
the said Sachems and their Subjects now present do for and in
the names of themselves and their heirs forever, give, Grant, al-
ienate and confirme all their Right and Interest, Claime or de-
mand to a certaine Parcell of Land,.. . to bee given, granted and
confirmed unto the said Richard Nicolls... to hold and Enjoy
the same as his free Land and Possession against any Clayme
54. Wilbur R. Jacobs, British Indian Policies to 1783, in 4 HIsTORY OF INDIAN-WHrrE
RELATTONS 5 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1988).
55. See id. at 185-94.
56. Id. at 185.
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hereafter to bee made by the said Sachems or their Sub-
jects ... "
A multitude of troubles, however, marred the smooth transfer of
Indian land title to the English. This was largely the result of the chaotic
mix of English economic, moral, and political motives, conflicting
policies of different colonial governments, and the active international
competition the British were always cognizant of from Spain and France.
The fact that individual colonists, land speculating companies, colonial
governments, and the actions of the Crown herself rarely had common
interests or attitudes about the tribes only served to complicate matters.
With chaos reigning supreme, the British government decided it was
time to impose more structure on Indian affairs by centralizing Indian
policy in the hands of the Crown. Furthermore, tribes had been consistent
in their complaints to British and colonial political figures about the
unmasked pressures they had been enduring regarding their lands. Thus,
when Iroquois leaders met the colonial delegates at the Albany
Conference in June 1754, they candidly stated their grievances. While
the sale of liquor was troublesome to the Iroquois Confederacy, of
greatest concern was the fact that their land was being taken by
unscrupulous means. "We understand that there are writings for all our
lands, so that we shall have none left but the very spot we live upon and
hardly that.. ..,,
The Albany delegates' response was a structured plan written by
Benjamin Franklin but heavily influenced by the Iroquois Confederacy's
system of government. It called for the uniting of the colonies under a
general government, with a President General and Grand Council, which
would manage the affairs of the United States in matters of defense and
commerce with the Indians. The plan, however, was premature and failed
because the colonial assemblies were not yet prepared to surrender a
measure of their sovereignty to establish a central government.
5 9
-BRITAIN CENTRALIZES CONTROL OF INDIAN POLICY
It was clear to British officials that there was a pressing need for
more centralized authority vis-A-vis Indian tribes if the tribes were to
57. VII EARLY AMiucAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREAxIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 (Alden
T. Vaughan ed., 1985); NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY TREATIES, 1609-1682, at 307-10
(University Publications of America, 1985).
58. DAvID HOROWITZ, THE FIRST FRONTIER: THE INDIAN WARS AND AMERICA'S
ORIGINS, 1607-1776, at 169 (1978).
59. See id.
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remain allied with the English. Thus, from 1755 to 1756, the British
Crown created a northern and southern department of Indian affairs,
manned respectively by superintendents William Johnson and Edmond
Atkin. The superintendents, rather than individual colonies, had full
command of political relations with Indian tribes. Johnson, who had
within his jurisdiction the powerful Iroquois Confederacy, was expected
to ease the concerns of the Indians "with respect to the Lands which have
been fraudulently taken from them" and to address other grievances such
as including traders.
60
The year 1763 proved to be of great significance for British, French,
and Indian relations. By the Treaty of Paris, ending the Seven Year War
with France, the English claimed all of French Canada and North
America east of the Mississippi, as well as Spanish Florida. England was
now the dominant European power in Eastern North America. Tribal
nations, many of whom had been allies with the French, however, were
wary of this expansion of English power. In the spring of 1763, Indians
throughout the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region launched a
number of assaults against the British and captured a number of British
forts. This was
traditionally attributed to the ambition of the Ottawa leader
Pontiac, was in fact a wide-ranging attempt to establish a native
position of power at a time of uncertainty and change, and al-
though the British retook their posts by 1765, the natives' point
was made. In later calculations, the English would weigh Indian
perceptions and demands more heavily.
A direct result of this flexing of indigenous military muscle was the
Crown's enunciation of the Royal Proclamation on October 7, 1763. The
Proclamation recalled all settlers from west of the crest of the
Appalachian Mountains, forbade emigration there until further notice,
and authorized trade with Indians, but only by licensed government
62agents. For our purposes, the most important measure in the
Proclamation was the establishment of a boundary line-a clear
delineation of Indian ownership of Indian Country. This boundary to
separate Indian land from Anglo settlements, immediately nullified, if
such a nullification was even necessary, the preposterous "sea to sea"
60. Id. at 179.
61. Elliot West, American Frontier, in THE OxFORD HISTORY OF THE AmERICAN WEST
188 (Clyde A. Milner, II, et al. eds., 1994).
62. See Jacobs, supra note 54, at 10.
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land claims based on the colonial charters dating back to the early
1600S.
63
The Royal Proclamation and, in particular, the land boundary were
difficult to enforce. Colonists, land speculators, and fur traders continued
their agitation for access to and eventual ownership of more Indian
territory so that in the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, a modification of the
Proclamation, the Iroquois nations ceded a great deal of land to Britain.
Despite this treaty, Britain was intent on slowing frontier expansion. In
1773, an act was passed which forbade any new grants to speculators. In
1774, with the passage of the Quebec Act, all the land north of the Ohio
River was closed to all but the most limited trade and settlement. Thus,
the idea of a boundary line, though breached many times by American
colonists, was a fundamental concept of both British and later American
policymakers in their efforts to recognize tribal lands and assure the
tribes that their remaining territory would be protected from intrusion. It
remains an important concept of federal Indian policy and law even
today.
When the thirteen colonies declared their independence from Great
Britain on July 4, 1776, claiming, as one of their reasons for revolting
that the King of England had "endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of
our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare
is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions," they
were acknowledging in a graphic way tribal sovereignty and
independence and were recognizing the unwelcomed fact that virtually
all Indian nations were in alliance with Great Britain against the
rebellious colonies.
The Americans' defeat of the British, and many of her Indian allies,
was confirmed at the peace arrangements at the Treaty of Paris, drawn up
in 1782 and signed on September 3, 1783. In signing this treaty, Great
Britain granted the new nation not only its independence, but also ceded
its jurisdictional claims and preemptive rights to a tremendous expanse
of land stretching in the north from the St. Lawrence River and the Great
Lakes, in the west to the Mississippi River, and in the south to the thirty-
first parallel.64
But what of the tribal nations who had not participated in the treaty
negotiations? The Americans realized that they needed to be appeased,
and steps were taken to assure the Indians that their lands were to be
protected. As evidence that the fledgling nation had not gained
immediate ownership to this territory, but had merely assumed Britain's
63. See id.
64. See West, supra note 61, at 123.
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obligations as the preeminent European sovereign with the right of first
purchase of Indian land, is a congressional proclamation issued less than
three weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Paris. This document
formally forbade White settlement on Indian lands outside state
jurisdiction. This measure also contained a provision regarding the sale
of Indian land. Like the Royal Proclamation of 1763, Congress declared
that no Indian land purchased by states or individuals would be valid
without the express sanction of Congress. This action was meant to
reassure the tribes that their preexisting land rights were to be protected
from persons or companies bent on their appropriation.
65
The federal government, of course, did not treat tribes uniformly.
Factors which contributed to inconsistent policy included the size and
strength of a tribe from a military perspective, the geo-political position
of a tribe in relation to other European competitors and tribes, and the
perceived cultural status of a tribe-with some being perceived as more
civilizable than others. In fact, for a brief period, from 1784 to 1787, the
federal government spoke haughtily of claiming the Indians country by
"right of conquest," especially those tribes who had sided with Great
Britain in the war.
66
Despite such claims, the tribes maintained that they had not been
conquered and that their lands rightfully remained in their possession. In
1786, the Shawnee Chief, Kekewepellethe, after hearing the Americans'
outrageous demands and claims, emphatically said "and as to the land,
God gave us this country, we do not understand measuring out the land,
it is all ours."67 Ultimately, the fear of war with tribes-including fear of
its actual costs in real dollars, the probable loss of much human life, and
fear of world opinion about the character of the United States for waging
war against tribes-compelled American policymakers to abandon their
pretentious claims to Indian soil based on the spurious doctrine of
conquest. The combination of anticipated expenses and intense tribal
resistance, and Secretary of War Henry Knox's views that the United
States should operate its Indian policy from principles of humanity and
honorable intentions and not conquest-discovery was not even part of
the discourse-are largely responsible for the treaty relationship which
ensued.
65. See PRuCHA, supra note 53, at 32.
66. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIEs: THE HISTORY OF A
POLmcAL ANOMALY 42-54 (1994) (discussing the Treaty of Fort Stanwix and treaties
with the Western Indians).
67. Id. at51.
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DISCOVERY AS PERCEIVED BY THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE
EXECUTIVE: PREEMPTION NOT OWNERSHIP
A close reading of recorded statements of indigenous leaders, an
examination of the literal language of the early treaty record from the
1780s through the War of 1812 and beyond, and the policy
pronouncements of congressional committees, the president, and various
high-placed federal officials, demonstrates that although the United
States initially preferred to act as if it were the actual legal owner of all
of America, the historical record draws a radically different picture. In
reality, the federal government's dealings with tribes amounted to
exercising an exclusive preemptive right to be the first purchaser of any
lands that tribes might choose to sell.
In fact, during the American Republic's formative and fragile years,
the central government was most keenly interested in establishing and
maintaining peace with tribal nations, in clarifying its title to land
actually occupied, and in providing assurances to tribes that their
territorial rights and boundaries would be respected, lest the tribes be
drawn to align with Spain or Great Britain.
Tribal nations during this same period, at a minimum, worked to
maintain a fixed boundary between their lands and those of European
nation-states and the Americans; they worked to secure formal
acknowledgments of their independent status and of their right to control
the disposition of their aboriginal territories; and they worked to pursue
an unimpeded flow of European manufactured goods.
As already shown, there is certainly some evidence that a segment
of American policymakers, in the period immediately after the
Revolutionary War terminated, felt that they were in a strategic position
to dictate terms to those tribes who had aligned militarily with Great
Britain and against the United States during the war. This is subtly
evident in a letter from George Washington to James Duane on
September 7, 1783. In the letter, Washington chastised several tribes for
having joined with Great Britain, but he hastened to add that the federal
government was magnanimous enough to forgive them:
But as we prefer Peace to a State of Warfare, as we consider
them [tribes] as a deluded People; as we pers[u]ade ourselves
that they are convinced, from experience, of their error in taking
68. See JONEs, supra note 2, at 44.
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up the Hatchet against us, and that their true Interest and safety
must now depend upon our friendship .... 69
Even in this mild rebuke of tribes, Washington still articulated the
need for a boundary line to separate Indian territory from that belonging
to the Americans. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Washington wanted
the Indians to understand that the Americans would eventually be
approaching them with a request for additional land cessions to
accommodate the land-hungry population and the increasing flow of
European immigrants.
Washington understood that peaceful and orderly westward
expansion depended upon peaceful dealings with the tribes. "I am clear
in my opinion," noted Washington, "that policy and economy point very
strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians,
and the propriety of purchasing their Lands in preference to attempting to
drive them by force of arms out of their Country. ... ,70
Besides facing significant indigenous resistance to any unilateral
federal efforts bent on claiming territory under the doctrines of discovery
and conquest after the Revolutionary War, the federal government,
surprisingly, was also confronted by Great Britain, which had adopted a
position of diplomatic support for indigenous land rights. As Jones
noted:
When the northern and western Indians asserted that the [1768]
Fort Stanwix line was the only proper boundary between their
,land and that of white America, British officials backed the as-
sertion. The officials assured the Indians that Americans had no
claim whatsoever to land beyond the Ohio, since King George
would not and could not have given to the Americans what he
had no right to give.7'
THE CONFIRMATION OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS IN AMERICAN
INDIAN TREATIES
As distinctive sovereigns exercising inherent sovereign powers, the
negotiation, ratification, and proclamation of Indian treaties confirmed
the separate political status of indigenous nations. It is a well known, if
69. DocuMENTs OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY I (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d ed.
1990).
70. Id. at 2.
71. JONES, supra note 2, at 142 (emphasis added).
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little appreciated, fact that no other racial or ethnic group in America
signed treaties with the federal government. This treaty relationship
means that tribal nations enjoy an extra-constitutional, nation-to-nation
relationship with the United States.
The unique triumvirate of corporate (self-government), individual
(eligibility for allotments, special reservations), and property (hunting,
fishing, and gathering) rights articulated in treaties further distinguish
Indians in a fundamental way from all other groups and individuals in the
United States.7 2 Indian treaties are, of course, susceptible to the political
machinations of the political branches (and sometimes even the
judiciary), but they remain, under the Constitution, the supreme law of
the land until they are expressly disavowed by Congress. Therefore, they
provide the core foundation of rights enjoyed by tribal nations.
Most of the treaties negotiated between tribes and the United States
after the Revolutionary War concluded were amity treaties designed to
restore some modicum of peace on the frontier and in the interior-
Treaty with the Six Nations (October 22, 1784); 73 Treaty with the
Wyandot (January 21, 1785); 74 Treaty with the Cherokee (November 28,
1785); 75 Treaty with the Choctaw (January 3, 1786);76 Treaty with the
Chickasaw (January 10, 1786);77 and the Treaty with the Shawnee
(January 31, 1786). 7
The first major Indian land cession treaty was the Treaty with the
Wyandot and other tribes at Fort Harmar on January 9, 1789'79 This
treaty was negotiated by the sachems and warriors of the assembled
tribes, on the one part, and by Commissioner Arthur St. Clair, Governor
of the Northwest Territory, for the United States. Article II established a
permanent boundary line between the tribes and the United States, and
the Indians ceded a tract of land in exchange for federal protection and
$6000 worth of goods. According to the treaty, the tribes "release, quit
claim, relinquish and ceded to the said United States all the land ...
72. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Treaties, in NATIVE AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 646-49 (Mary B. Davis ed., 1994).
73. See Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, U.S.-Sachems and Six Nations, 7
Stat. 15.
74. See Treaty with the Wiandot, Jan. 21, 1785, U.S.-Sachems, Wiandot, Deleware,
Chippawa and Ottawa Nations, 7 Stat. 16.
75. See Treaty with the Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 18.
76. See Treaty with the Choctaw, Jan. 3, 1786, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, 7 Stat. 21.
77. See Treaty with the Chickasaw, Jan. 10, 1786, U.S.-Chickasaw Nation, 7 Stat. 24.
78. See Treaty with the Shawnee, Jan. 31, 1786, U.S.-Shawnee Nation, 7 Stat. 26.
79. See Treaty with the Wiandot, Jan. 9, 1789, U.S.-Sachems, Wiandot, Deleware, Ot-
tawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima, and Sac Nations, 7 Stat. 28.
19981
Oklahoma City University Law Review
above described, so far as the said Indians formerly claimed the same;
for them the said United States to have and to hold the same in true and
absolute propriety forever.
'80
In article III, the United States announced that it was relinquishing
and quit claiming all the lands the tribes reserved to themselves under the
previous article. The only claims the United States had to the retained
Indian lands, of course, were based on the doctrine of discovery; but here
discovery entailed preemption, not ownership. This is manifest in the
language of the closing section of article III:
But the said nations, or either of them, shall not be at liberty to
sell or dispose of the same, or any part thereof, to any sovereign
power, except the United States; nor to the subjects or citizens of
any other sovereign power, nor to the subjects or citizens of the
United States.8'
This portion of the article harbors an interesting juxtaposition. If the
United States had actually "owned" full legal title to Indian lands under
the doctrine of discovery and was simply relinquishing those claims to
the tribes, why did the government's negotiators insist on including
language in the treaty that the tribes sell to no other sovereign "except
the United States?"
Several months later, on June 15, 1789, Secretary of War Henry
Knox wrote a report to President Washington concerning the
Northwestern Indians.82 In it, Knox forcefully advocated that justice and
dignity rather than force of arms should be the guiding principles of
federal Indian policy. Included also is a remarkably unclouded statement
acknowledging the Indians' ownership rights to their property:
The Indians being the prior occupants, possess the right of soil. It
cannot be taken from them unless by their free consent, or by the
right of conquest in a case of a just war. To dispossess them on
any other principle, would be a gross violation of the fundamen-
tal laws of nature, and of that distributive justice which is the
glory of a nation.
The principle of the Indian right to the lands they possess
being thus conceded, the dignity and interest-of the nation will be
80. Id. at art. II, 7 Stat. 28-29.
81. Id. at art. III, 7 Stat. 29 (emphasis added).
82. See 7 AMEiCAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 36, at 12-14. Knox was referring in this
report chiefly to the Wabash Indians who lived northwest of the Ohio.
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advanced by making it the basis of the future administration of
justice towards the Indian tribes.8 3
Scholars like Francis P. Prucha contend that the "right of soil" Knox
acknowledged here was little more than a right of occupancy, "which
permitted occupants to enjoy the usufruct of the land as long as they
occupied it."84 The United States, Prucha asserts, held the fee-simple
right of absolute dominion over the land based on the discovery
principle.
The historical evidence shown above does not support these
contentions. More realistically, the United States, as Jones's study
showed, by the post-Revolutionary period was forced to acknowledge
that it had a curtailed sovereignty and that this was a result of limitations
prescribed by the preexisting territorial rights of the tribes8
5
Corroborating treaty proof of the invalidity of the discovery
principle is found in a September 27, 1792, Treaty of peace and
friendship between the Wabash and Illinois tribes and the United States.
Rufus Putnam, a brigadier general, negotiated the treaty on behalf of the
federal government. After the two tribal nations agreed to perpetual
peace and placed themselves under the protection of the United States,
article IV focused on their unabridged land rights.
The United States solemnly guaranty to the Wabash, and the Illi-
nois nations, or tribes of Indians, all the lands to which they have
a just claim; and no part shall e[v]er be taken from them, but by
a fair purchase, and to their satisfaction. That the lands originally
belonged to the Indians; it is theirs, and theirs only. That they
have a right to sell, and a right to refuse to sell. And that the
United States will protect them in their said just rights86
This provision contains language showing that the United States
was fully cognizant of the Indians' unencumbered title to their territory,
save the preemptive right of the federal government. When President
Washington communicated this treaty to the Senate for ratification on
February 13, 1793, he sent an accompanying letter, in which he urged the
Senate to consider adding an exclusive preemption statement to the
fourth article that would grant the United States first opportunity to
purchas'e any lands the Indians might decide to sell in the future. A
83. Id. at 13.
84. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 226.
85. See JONES, supra note 2, at 147.
86. 7 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 36, at.338 (emphasis added).
19981
Oklahoma City University Law Review
Senate committee recommended postponing the treaty until the next
session of Congress. It was also suggested that the president should
negotiate a new article with the tribes that would give the federal
government the preemption right it desired. The United States soon
learned, however, that a number of the Wabash chiefs who had
negotiated the treaty had died of smallpox.87
Finally, in 1794, when the Senate ratification process was renewed,
a vote was taken on the treaty with an amendment that would have
provided for preemption. The Senate voted the treaty down, however,
twenty-one to four.8' Shortly thereafter, war erupted with the two tribes
and the treaty issue was mooted.
The powerful Iroquois Confederacy also participated in treaties that
confirmed their undivided title to their lands. The Treaty with the Six
Nations89 in the fall of 1794 is one such document. In article II, the
United States acknowledged the lands reserved to the Cayuga,
Onondaga, and Oneida in their treaties with New York State
to be their property; and the United States will never claim the
same, nor disturb them or either of the Six Nations, nor their In-
dian friends residing thereon and united with them, in the free
use and enjoyment thereof: but the said reservations shall re-
main theirs, until they choose to sell the same to the people of the
United States, who have the right to purchase.90
The federal government, as this article shows, secured the right of
preemption it had been unable to gain in the earlier Wabash and Illinois
treaty. What exclusive preemption meant was explained by Thomas
Jefferson:
I considered our right of preemption of the Indian lands, not as
amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship
whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after the extin-
guishment of a present right, which gave us no present right
whatever, but of preventing other nations from taking posses-
sion, and so defeating our expectancy; that the Indians had the
87. See PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 91.
88. See id.
89. See Treaty with the Six Nations, Nov, 11, 1794, U.S.-Six Nations, 7 Stat. 44.
90. Id. at art. II, 7 Stat. 45.
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full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they
choose to keep it, and that this might be forever.9'
The right of exclusive preemption expressed in these and other treaties,
as endorsed by Congress and the President, is a wholly different entity
from that of absolute proprietorship or fee-simple title based on
Marshall's judicially generated construction of the doctrine of discovery.
Critical analysis of a pivotal treaty-the Treaty of Greenville92 -
provides another burst of historical and political data which, when read
with the previous information, effectively defangs the doctrine of
discovery. Although the treaty was negotiated in the wake of the Indians'
defeat by American troops led by General Anthony Wayne at the Battle
of Fallen Timbers on the Maumee River, and with the Indians having
learned that their ally, Great Britain, would no longer provide patronage,
the literal language of the treaty reveals that the federal government
wielded no absolute sovereignty or proprietorship over the lands retained
by the Indian nations. Although the signatory tribes-the Wyandot,
Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomie, Miami, Eel River,
Wea, Kickapoo, Piankeshaw, and Kaskaskia--ceded an enormous
amount of land to the United States, including the southern part of Ohio
and some land in present-day Indiana, a permanent boundary line was
established between the tribes' reserved lands (north of the Ohio, east of
the Mississippi, and south of the Great Lakes) and those of the
Americans.
More important, the language of article V continues to reflect the
reality that the tribes were the only legitimate proprietors of their
remaining territory and that the United States merely sought assurances
that it would have preemptive rights to purchase tribal lands in the future:
The Indian tribes who have a right to those lands, are quietly to
enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon so long as
they please, without any molestation from the United States; but
when those tribes, or any of them, shall be disposed to sell their
lands, or any part of them, they are to be sold only to the United
States; and until such sale, the United States will protect all the
said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoyment of their lands against all
citizens of the United States, and against all other white persons
91. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 227 (quoting THE WRrriNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
17:328-29 (1903-1904) (emphasis added).
92. See Treaty of Greenville, Aug. 3, 1795, U.S.-Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees,
Ottawas, Chippewas, Putawatimes, Miamis, Eel-river, Wea's, Kickapoos, Piankashaws,
and Kaskaskias, 7 Stat. 49.
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who intrude upon the same. And the said Indian tribes again ac-
knowledge themselves to be under the protection of the said
United States and no other power whatever.
93
The previous article, IV, does contain a passage in which the United
States promised to relinquish its claim to remaining tribal lands, but the
government was relinquishing nothing more than its exclusive right of
preemption, not ownership of the Indians' land. The United States, to
reassure the tribes about what exactly they were relinquishing, made this
statement in the first sentence of article V: "To prevent any
misunderstanding about the Indian lands relinquished by the United
States in the fourth article [the lands retained by the tribes], it is now
explicitly declared, that the meaning of that relinquishment is this .... "
To reiterate the central thesis: if, under the doctrine of discovery, the
United States literally "owned" all of America, then why did the
government in this and the previous treaties analyzed insist on inserting a
preemptive clause giving them the first option to purchase tribal lands? It
can only be because the doctrine of discovery, although effective as an
international principle at regulating affairs between competing foreign
powers and the American nation, had no direct bearing on the tribes'
actual property rights. The best the United States could hope for, and
sometimes insisted upon, was that the signatory tribes would consent to
giving the federal government first purchase rights. As we have seen, the
tribes agreed to this clause on a number of occasions.
There is one other treaty before the War of 1812 in which this
exclusive purchase provision is found. In an agreement with the Sac and
Fox on November 3, 1804, 95 article IV states emphatically that the
United States would never interfere with the Indians' land rights and that
the government would "protect" the tribes in the enjoyment of their lands
against all others. "And the said tribes," it was declared, "do hereby
engage that they will never sell their lands or any part thereof to any
sovereign power, but the United States, nor to the citizens or subjects of
any other sovereign power, nor to the citizens of the United States.'9
6
By 1800, land cession treaties had become a more common type of
diplomatic arrangement between tribes and the federal government. And
when the United States purchased France's jurisdictional position in that
93. Id. at art. V, 7 Stat. 52.
94. Id.
95. See Agreement with Sac and Fox, Nov. 3, 1804, U.S.-Sac and Fox Nations, 7 Stat.
84.
96. Id. at art. IV, 7 Stat. 51 (emphasis added).
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massive territory known as the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, this created
new opportunities for national development, western expansion, and
Indian policy experimentation. It also opened up a Pandora's box of
uncertainties relating to the actual extent of the territory and the number
and orientation of the tribes inhabiting the region. And although
President Jefferson proposed removal of eastern Indian tribes to lands
west of the Mississippi, he was more keen on their being assimilated or
civilized into western culture.
97
Tribes, on the contrary, were increasingly willing to engage in war
in their efforts to stem the growing tide of Whites into their country. By
1805, Indians in the Ohio Valley, the Great Lakes Country, and the Old
Southwest, led by two Shawnees, the Prophet, Tenskwatawa, and his
brother, Tecumseh, sought to form a united indigenous front to stifle
Anglo advancement and restore traditional Indian life. Most of the
Indians ultimately joined forces as allies with Great Britain in the War of
1812 against the United States. Tecumseh's followers fought in at least
150 engagemefits against the Americans. The United States, however,
again emerged victorious from the war. Tecumseh's death at the Battle of
the Thames in October 1813 signaled the end of effective Indian
resistance between the Ohio and the Mississippi River
98
In the old southwest (Mississippi and Alabama), the Upper Creeks,
many of whom had taken to the Prophet's message, also fought valiantly
to protect their lands from further intrusions. They, too, were defeated,
however, in 1814, at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend by a combined force
of American troops, led by Andrew Jackson with Creek and Cherokee
allies. In the subsequent Treaty of Fort Jackson, concluded on August 9,
1814, the Creeks, both the Upper and even the lower Creeks who had
remained neutral or sided with Jackson's forces, were forced to cede
more than twenty-two million acres of land that included parts of western
Georgia and much of Alabama.99 This enormous land cession was
considered by the United States as "an equivalent for all expenses
incurred in prosecuting the war to its termination."
100
Notwithstanding the British and Indians defeat in 1814, Great
Britain, in negotiating the terms of the Treaty of Ghent with the United
97. See Reginald Horsman, United States Indian Policies, 1776-1815, in HISTORY OF
INDIAN-WHrrE RELATIONS 36 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1988).
98. See R. David Edmunds, Tecumseh, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS
621 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1996).
99. See Treaty of Fort Jackson, Aug. 9, 1814, U.S.-Creek Nation, 7 Stat. 20.
100. Id.
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States,'0 ' insisted as a "sine qua non" (an indispensable condition) of a
treaty of peace that "the peace be extended to the Indian allies of Great
Britain, and that the boundary of their territory be definitively marked
out as a permanent barrier between the dominions of Great Britain and
the United States.' 0 2
The United States treaty delegation, led by John Q. Adams, initially
and throughout the early months of negotiations, refused to concede the
Indian territorial boundary delineation as laid out by the British. The
Americans argued that recognition of such an amount of territory "would
comprehend a great number of American citizens; not less, perhaps, than
a hundred thousand.' 0 3 The British delegation, led by Gambier, retorted
that they were not "prepared to abandon the Indian nations to their
fate" 04 and that their Indian allies should also be directly involved in the
peace negotiations as a "principle of public law.'405
Adams responded by describing what he termed the "humane and
liberal policy" of the United States towards tribes. A policy, however,
which would not extend to involving the tribes as participants in these
particular treaty negotiations:
Under that system the Indians residing within the United States
are so far independent that they live under their own customs,
and not under the laws of the United States; that their rights upon
the lands where they inhabit or hunt, are secured to them by
boundaries defined in amicable treaties between the United
States and themselves; and that whenever those boundaries are
varied, it is also by amicable and voluntary treaties, by which
they receive from the United States ample compensation for
every right they have to the lands ceded by them. They are so far
dependent as not to have the right to dispose of their lands to any
private persons, not to any Power other than the United States,
and to be under their protection alone, and not under that of any
other Power. Whether called subjects, or by whatever name
designated, such is the relation between them and the United
States.'0 6
101. See Treaty of Ghent, Dec. 24, 1814, U.S.-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 218.
102. 3 AMERiCAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 36, at 708.
103. Id. at 709.
104. Id. at 714.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 716.
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The British rejoined two weeks later by noting their desire to sign a
treaty but emphatically maintained that they would sign only if "the
Indian nations are included in it, and restored to all the rights, privileges,
and territories which they enjoyed in the year 1811 ...., The United
States remained unwilling to recognize the rights of tribes as
"independent nations" out of fear that the tribes might be willing to
realign with the British. Such action, said the Americans, "would place
them [the tribes] effectually and exclusively under her protection, instead
of being, as heretofore, under that of the United States. '08
The British delegation quickly responded and challenged the
American's "novel and alarming pretension," a pretension that Britain
herself had used on occasion in its direct dealing with tribes: that Indian
nations were to be considered the subjects of the United States whose
territory was subject to the disposal of the federal government.
"Pretensions such as these," said the British delegation, "Great Britain
can never recogni[z]e."' 0 9 Britain had to finally concede, however, that
the United States would not consent to having the tribes as direct parties
in the peace negotiations. Instead, she settled for an article requiring that
the United States recognize the preexisting rights, possessions, etc., of
tribes prior to 1811. This, the Americans accepted.
Hence, article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent, dated December 24, 1814,
states that:
The United States of America engage to put an end, immediately
after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all
the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at
the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such
tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights, and
privileges which they may have enjoyed, or been entitled to,...
provided always, that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist
from all hostilities against the United States of America, their
citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty
being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist ac-
cordingly .... 0
Although tribes had not participated as a separate sovereign in these
negotiations, the above discussion demonstrates that their preexisting
107. Id. at 718.
108. Id. at 720.
109. Id. at 722.
110. Id. at 747-48.
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rights, including their territorial rights, were to be honored by both the
United States and Great Britain. In one of the first post 1812 treaties
negotiated between the United States and Indian tribes, concluded at
Portage des Sioux on the Mississippi, we find tribes and the federal
government agreeing to end hostilities, establish perpetual peace, and the
United States providing reassurances to the tribes that their preexisting
treaties were recognized and reconfirmed.'
In a series of treaties with the Potawatomie, the Piankeshaw, the
Teton and the Yankton Sioux, among others, the United States and the
tribes, anxious to reestablish peace and friendship, agreed that "every
injury or act of hostility by one or other of the contracting parties against
the other, shall be mutually forgiven and forgot" and that the parties





The federal attitude of mutual peace and friendship espoused in the
Portage des Sioux treaties conform with the other basic tenets of federal
Indian policy that had been established and would remain firmly in place
into the 1830s and beyond: 1) recognition of Indian land rights by the
establishment of clear boundaries for Indian Country; 2) the use of
formal treaties with tribes as the principal means of dealing with tribal
nations; 3) regulation of Indian trade by the federal government as a
means of maintaining an exclusive relationship with the tribes, but also
to protect the Indians from being defrauded; 4) expenditures by the
United States designed to promote the civilization and education of
Indians; and 5) a series of trade and intercourse acts-first enacted in
1790 and made permanent in 1834-which were aimed at restraining the
actions of whites and providing justice to the Indians.113
Importantly, the federal government, not only in the treaties
discussed above, but also in the trade and intercourse acts, included
specific provisions relating to Indian land which recognized tribal
ownership. The United States, rather than being a proprietor of all of
America under the doctrine of discovery, served primarily as a protector
of Indian interests in their lands and stood first in line should a tribe
choose to sell any of its lands. Section 12 of the 1834 Trade and
Intercourse Act declared that "no purchase, grant, lease, or other
conveyance of land, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian
nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless
the same shall be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to
11I. See S. Doc. No. 57-452, at 79-85 (1903).
112. Treaty with the Piankishaw, July 18, 1815, U.S.-Piankishaw, 7 Stat. 124.
113. See PRUCHA, supra note 53, at 2-3.
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the Constitution."'"14 Hence, in the 1834 law, the permanent codification
of the previously temporary laws, it was stated in the first section that
"Indian Country" consists of all the land west of the Mississippi and not
within the states or Missouri or Louisiana or the territory of Arkansas
and include lands east of the Mississippi "not within any state to which
the Indian title has not been extinguished."'
JUDICIAL MISCONSTRUCTION OF DISCOVERY
In 1823, the United States Supreme Court rendered a stunning
ruling in Johnson v. M'Intosh1 6 that attempted to dramatically redefine
the political contours of the indigenous and federal relationship in a way
that would elevate the federal government to a superior proprietary
position relative to tribal nations. The principal question in the case was
whether the Indian title which had been ceded by the Illinois and
Piankeshaw tribes to the plaintiffs (Johnson, et al.,) under two separate
land transactions in 1773 and 1775 could be recognized in the federal
courts, or whether the defendant's (M'Intosh's) title, which had been
purchased from the United States in 1818-territory that was part of
Johnson's original purchase from the tribes-was valid. In short,
Marshall asked whether tribes had a title that could be conveyed to
whomever they chose. But this was not the question raised by the facts.
The question should have been whether private individuals could
purchase Indian land, or whether only the national government had that
authority.
Marshall and the Court, however, for reasons purely political,
refused to recognize, as the previous actions of the United States
government in its treaties attested, as well as those of the European
sovereigns, that tribes held a title equal to the fee-simple title of Whites
that was largely unaffected by the claims of the European and United
States "discoverers." The Court apparently feared that such a holding
would have nullified state and federal grants derived from Indians.
But neither did the Court hold that the doctrine of discovery
completely vanquished Indian title, since this would have left the tribes
with no enforceable interests whatsoever. Instead, Marshall craftily
reached a political and legal compromise that avoided both of these
visions of Indian title.
114. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834 § 12, 4 Stat. 729, 730.
115. Id.
116. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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At the heart of the decision was Chief Justice John Marshall's
distorted, historically inaccurate, and legally fictitious discussion of the
doctrine of discovery. According to Marshall, the principle meant that
the "discovering" European nation, and the United States as successor in
interest to Great Britain's rights of discovery in North America, had
gained a superior title to both unoccupied and occupied indigenous lands.
"Thus," said Marshall, "has our whole country been granted by the
crown while in the occupation of the Indians. These grants purport to
convey the soil as well as the right of dominion to the grantees.'4
1 7
Marshall, however, was re-writing history to suit the federal
government's needs here. As the preceding doctrinal analysis has shown,
none of the previous sovereigns, including Great Britain, had acted as if
it had a superior title to Indian land. They did claim to be the
"sovereign," in the sense of being the premier political entity vis-h-vis
other competitor states, and, at times, even in their relationship to tribes,
but the treaty and statutory analysis showed that this did not translate into
their being the sole proprietor or land owner of all land. The evidence
showed that Indian title, while understood as being substantively
different from the fee-simple title of Europeans, nevertheless was a
recognized Indian ownership of the soil that rested in the tribes until they
chose to sell the same to the bidding European sovereign. This was
especially true from the standpoint of the British as the discussion of the
Treaty of Ghent evidenced.
Marshall's articulation of the doctrine of discovery in M'Intosh
allowed that tribes were the "rightful occupants of the soil," retaining a
lesser legal claim to their lands, but also suggested that their "complete
sovereignty" as independent nations was held to be significantly
"impaired" by the imperious claims of the federal government. Tribes
were also informed in this decision that they no longer possessed the
power to sell their lands to others. In short, the Marshall Court had
reduced indigenous groups to being possessors of an inferior occupancy
title. Capping off his largely imaginative opinion, Marshall ruled that the
United States, by stepping into Great Britain's shoes after the Treaty of
Paris was signed on September 3, 1783, ending the Revolutionary War,
had gained an exclusive and "absolute" legal title to all of America 18
The historical record shows that in reality, what the United States had
actually gained after the 1783 Paris treaty and the 1814 Treaty of Ghent,
contrary to Marshall's creative assertions, was merely an exclusive status
vis-i?-vis other European sovereigns. It only gained title to those lands
117. Id. at 579.
118. See id. at 588.
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Great Britain had already purchased from the Indians; it had not secured
the "absolute" title to the rest of America.
Even a cursory reading of M'Intosh uncovers the ethnocentric and
racist tone of the Justices. Marshall himself seemed well aware of the
absurdity of wielding the discovery principle from a factual standpoint,
but he found it expedient to rationalize its use from a policy and
philosophical perspective:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery
of an inhabited country into conquest may appear, if the princi-
ple has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sus-
tained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the
property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it
becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned." 9
As Dorothy Jones's opening quotation indicates, the discovery
principle as an international rule was not questioned by the competing
foreign powers because they shared imperial and cultural premises and
had devised the principle as a mechanism to eliminate or at least reduce
international conflicts. It was certainly questioned, however, and openly
defied, by indigenous nations who had occupied their lands for millennia.
Sir William Johnson learned this directly in his dealings with the
Iroquois: "The Indians were sometimes bitter, sometimes cynical, and
frequently outspoken about the European assumption that unceded Indian
land could be bartered back and forth at European conference tables.' 2 °
The Indians were amused, said Johnson, by the actions of both the
French and the British "with stories of their upright intentions, and that
they made War for the protection of the Indians' rights, but that they
plainly found it was carried on to see who would become masters of
what was the property of neither the one nor the other."'
121
HISTORICALLY APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF DISCOVERY
As the previous pages point out, the fairly consistent actions of
Spain, France, Great Britain, and even the United States, both before and
after the M'Intosh ruling, strongly suggests that these governments only
sometimes attempted to force the view that tribes were simply occupants
with a diminished title to their ancestral lands. On the contrary, the treaty
record, legislative actions, and sovereign and presidential
119. Id. at 591.
120. JONES, supra note 2, at 72.
121. Id.
1998]
Oklahoma City University Law Review
pronouncements indicate that tribes were the actual owners of the soil
and that the European and American sovereigns in order to gain Indian
title went to great lengths to peacefully purchase said title before
claiming ownership.
Furthermore, because tribal nations were not parties in the M'Intosh
litigation-though they were indirectly involved, having sold the land to
both the non-Indian parties-an argument can be made that the precedent
is not binding on Indian tribes since by their nonparticipation they had
not consented to be bound by the Court's holding. The fact that tribal
nations were extra-constitutional sovereigns at this time adds further
proof of its nonapplicability to their proprietary rights.
M'Intosh is sandwiched between ample treaty precedent, statutory
law, and sovereign pronouncements which point to a more accurate
understanding that the discovery doctrine merely gave the alleged
"discoverer" the right to be the exclusive purchaser of any land tribes
were willing to sell. In fact, it is this theory of discovery as an exclusive
preemptive right which appears in the next two major Supreme Court
cases, Worcester v. Georgia122 and Mitchel v. United States.123 In
Worcester, also authored by Marshall, the Court made clear that
discovery did not restrict the rights of Indians to their territory.
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited
by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent
of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of
their own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is dif-
ficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of ei-
ther quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of
dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they
occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give
the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled
the preexisting rights of its ancient possessors.
124
Marshall, went further, however, in his historical analysis of discovery in
an effort, seemingly, to correct the effrontery he had issued in the
M'Intosh ruling:
The great maritime powers of Europe discovered and visited dif-
ferent parts of this continent at nearly the same time. The object
122. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
123. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
124. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 542-43.
[Vol. 23
Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Discovery
was too immense for any one of them to grasp the whole; and the
claimants were too powerful to submit to the exclusive or unrea-
sonable pretensions of any single potentate. To avoid bloody
conflicts, which might terminate disastrously to all, it was neces-
sary for the nations of Europe to establish some principle which
all would acknowledge, and which should decide their respective
rights as between themselves. This principle, suggested by the
actual state of things, was "that discovery gave title to the gov-
ernment by whose subjects or by whose authority it was made,
against all other European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession."
This.principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because it
was the interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation
making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole
right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements on it. It was
an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition
among those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the
previous rights of those [like tribes] who had not agreed to it. It
regulated the right given by discovery among the European dis-
coverers; but could not affect the rights of those already in pos-
session, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by vir-
tue of a discovery made before the memory of man. It gave the
exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that right on a de-
nial of the right of the possessor to sell. '25
Marshall continued his analysis by challenging one of the basic
myths about the discovery era. Some commentators maintain that the
King of England's charters to the original colonies entailed a conveyance
of the actual soil to the newly established colony. Marshall explicitly
denied this. He declared that:
The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements
made on the seacoast, or the companies under whom they were
made, acquired legitimate power by them to govern the people,
or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of
any man. They were well understood to convey the title which,
according to the common law of European sovereigns respecting
America, they might rightfully convey, and no more. This was
the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were
willing to sell. The crown could not be understood to grant what
125. Id. at 543-44 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the crown did not affect to claim, nor was it so understood ....
These colonial grants and charters merely asserted a title
against Europeans only, and were considered as blank paper so
far as the rights of the native were concerned.126
Three years later, in Mitchel v. United States,'27 the Supreme Court
added further judicial tinder to the Worcester precedent disavowing the
doctrine of discovery as a doctrine vesting absolute ownership of
America in the discovering states. Although not explicitly disclaiming
the doctrine as Marshall had done, Justice Baldwin, in describing Indian
title, used language that easily supported Marshall's Worcester views.
For instance, Baldwin noted that "friendly Indians were protected in the
possession of the lands they occupied, and were considered as owning
them by a perpetual right of possession in the tribe or nation inhabiting
them ....
Baldwin continued by declaring what he thought the status of Indian
title was: "it is enough to consider it as a settled principle, that their right
of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.' 29
It then logically followed that if Indians held their lands with a sacred
title, comparable to fee-simple, then they must also possess the power to
sell those lands. In a statement directly at odds with theM'Intosh holding
that Indians lack the power to convey their lands, the Mitchel court held
that "the Indian right to the lands as property was not merely of
possession, that of alienation was concomitant; both were equally
secured, protected, and guarantied by Great Britain and Spain ....
CONCLUSION
Congress is identified in the Constitution as being the branch of
government empowered to exercise plenary and exclusive authority in
the policy field of Indian affairs. It fulfills its constitutional mandate by
generating legislation and establishing tribal specific and general policies
that will democratically guide the political relationship between tribal
nations and the federal government-a relationship rooted in treaty
arrangements. Alongside Congress, the executive branch, at least until
1871,131 had at least a minor role in negotiating and certainly in
126. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
127. 34 U.S.,(9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
128. Id. at 745.
129. Id. at 746.
130. Id.
131. Congress, via an appropriation rider (16 Stat. 566), questionably terminated the
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proclaiming the treaty arrangements that provide the ongoing diplomatic
linkages between tribes and the United States.
The Supreme Court's role in Indian affairs is, therefore, restrained
by the force of congressional plenary power. One of the Court's primary
roles in Indian affairs, especially insofar as Indian land rights are
involved, should be to broadly interpret treaty language, especially
ambiguous language, in a way that comports with both the tribes' and the
United States' understanding of how the two peoples' affairs can best be
carried out in a perpetual state of fairness, justice, and informed consent.
The doctrine of discovery, when defined as an exclusive principle
designed to regulate European and American affairs, is a colonial
metaphor that gave the quickest and usually the most powerful European
nations the upper hand in their efforts to colonize various parts of the
world, including North America. The doctrine of discovery, however,
when defined as benevolent paternalism or, as it was in the M'Intosh
decision, to mean that the federal government holds the fee-simple title
to all the Indian lands in the United States, is a clear legal fiction that
needs to be explicitly stricken from the federal government's political
and legal vocabulary.
Discovery as entailing the instantaneous ownership of Indian lands,
thereby reducing Indians to being simple tenants in their aboriginal
homelands, runs contrary to the force and continued vitality of tribal
sovereignty, is inimical to prior and later congressional and executive
policy pronouncements and subsequent Supreme Court precedent, and is
directly at odds with the bulk of extant European and United States treaty
provisions, which abundantly demonstrate that tribes possessed full and
complete legal title to their lands. Federal abandonment of such a
demeaning and unjust legal fiction by congressional, presidential, and
judicial action would be a significant first step towards the reformulation
of an Indian policy based on justice, humanity, and the "actual state of
things."
President's capacity to negotiate further treaties with tribes in 1871, although existing
treaties were to remain legally binding.
1998]
